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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The jurisdiction of this Court in this matter is based 
upon Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) and § 78-2-2(4) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The correctness of the trial court's entry of the 
Order and Judgment granting Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment where Defendants failed to present any admissible 
evidence to show a dispute of material fact for trial, and 
Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law, we review the trial court's ruling 
for correctness." White v. Deseelhorstf 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 
(Utah 1994) (affirming summary judgment). The appellate court 
evaluates only "whether the trial court erred in applying the 
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that 
there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree v. 
State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (same). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES. AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-34. Sale of trust property by 
trustee — Foreclosure of trust deed — Limitation of actions. 
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed 
shall be made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed as provided 
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by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be 
commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the 
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust 
deed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1. Time for commencement of 
actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has 
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation is 
prescribed by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne 
profits of real property — Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
. . . 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability 
founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in 
Section 78-12-22. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). Summary 
judgment — Motion and proceedings thereon. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
. . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
-2-
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e). Summary 
judgment — Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(c). Definitions — 
Hearsay. 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A# Nature of the Case 
This case was originally filed by Plaintiffs Stephen 
D. Oliverson and Ruth H. Oliverson (referred to hereinafter 
collectively as the "Oliversons") seeking, among other things, to 
quiet title to certain real property described more fully herein 
below (the "Property") . Defendant Lester Romero ("Romero") 
counterclaimed seeking, among other things, to foreclose a 
purported trust deed, dated July 2, 1986, on the Property of 
-3-
which Romero was the purported beneficiary.1 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On or about December 7, 1994, the Oliversons filed a 
Complaint against Romero and J. Scott Lundberg2 in which the 
Oliversons sought, among other things, to quiet title to the 
Property. On or about January 31, 1995, Romero filed an Answer, 
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint seeking, among other 
things, to foreclose a purported trust deed on the Property. 
On or about August 15, 1996, the Oliversons filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Oliversons1 Motion") on the 
ground that the applicable statute of limitations had run and 
therefore barred any action to foreclose upon Romero's trust deed 
as a matter of law. Romero, acting pro se, belatedly, and even 
after Oliversons had filed a notice to submit their motion for 
summary judgment to the court for decision, filed a hand-written 
document entitled "Answers to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion for 
1
 Nearly nine years after the fact, Romero claimed that the 
July, 1986, trust deed, which said it secured a note of even date 
therewith, was security for an ancient promissory note dated 
April 23, 1986, in the original principal amount of $6,000.00, 
pursuant to which Romero has claimed he is entitled to interest 
at the rate of 2 1/2% compounded monthly (which arguably could 
mean that over $100,000.00 is now owing on that ancient note 
under Romero's theory). 
2
 J. Scott Lundberg was the successor trustee of the trust 
deed by which Romero claimed an interest in the Property. J. 
Scott Lundberg has not appealed the trial court's decision. 
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Summary Judgment." Thereafter, the trial court granted Romero 
some time after retaining counsel to file a proper memorandum in 
opposition to the Oliversons1 Motion. On or about October 15, 
1996, Romero, through counsel, filed a "Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment." The only 
purported evidence Romero produced in opposition to the 
Oliversons1 Motion was an affidavit signed by Romero (the "Romero 
Affidavit") , which consisted entirely of inadmissible statements 
and immaterial allegations, as will be shown more fully below. 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court 
On March 18, 1997, the Oliversons1 Motion came on 
regularly for hearing before the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Anthony W. 
Schofield presiding. Romero was represented by counsel at the 
hearing. After hearing the oral arguments of counsel, the trial 
court ruled from the bench, granting the Oliversons1 Motion, 
declaring the foreclosure of Romero's trust deed was time-barred 
and that the Romero trust deed was null, void, and of no force or 
effect whatsoever, thereby quieting title to the Property in the 
Oliversons. At the trial court's instruction, the Oliversons' 
counsel prepared an Order and Judgment which was signed and 
approved as to form by Romero's counsel, and ultimately signed 
and entered by the Honorable Judge Anthony W. Schofield. The 
-5-
Order and Judgment included the court's Rule 54(b) certification 
finding that "[t]here is no just reason for delay and the Court 
directs that a summary judgment . . . be entered in favor of 
Plaintiffs and Huish, as provided in Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, pursuant to Plaintiffs' and Huish's respective 
motions for summary judgment."3 
D. Statement of Facts 
The Property that is the subject of this case is 
located in Utah County, State of Utah, and is more particularly 
described as: 
COMMENCING 4.90 % chains South of the Northwest corner 
of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 19, Township 4 South, 
Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian and running 
thence East 165 feet; thence North 69 feet; thence 
North 82° 39' West 187.5 feet; thence South 5° 21' West 
95.4 feet; thence North 86.5 East 30 feet to the Point 
of Beginning.4 
Third Party Defendant Robert K. Huish, a/k/a Bob K. 
Huish ("Huish"), previously owned the Property.5 While he owned 
the Property, Huish signed a trust deed (the "Trust Deed") 
recorded on the Property in favor of Romero, as beneficiary, 
3
 Record, page 379, para. 3 (Order and Judgment). 
4
 Record, page 378, para. 5 (Order and Judgment). 
5
 Record, page 194, para. 5 (Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment); see also Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
herein, -page 3, para. 4. 
dated July 2, 1986.6 The Trust Deed expressly stated that it 
secured a "promissory note of even date herewith."7 Huish further 
signed a promissory note in favor of Romero, also dated July 2, 
1986 (the "July Note").8 
The July Note expressly provided that it was payable 
in full "upon closing of the sale of" the Property.9 On or before 
October 29, 1986, Huish sold the Property to the Oliversons.10 
Romero did not initiate any foreclose of the Trust Deed until the 
filing of his Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint on or after 
January 31, 1995.n 
6
 Record, page 194, paras. 2-5 (Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment); see also Brief of Defendant-
Appellant herein, page 3, para. 4. 
7
 Record, page 194, para. 3 (Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment); Record, page 17, para. 6 (Complaint); 
Record, page 46, para. 5 (Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint). 
8
 Record, page 194, para. 4 (Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment); Record, page 17, para. 6 (Complaint); 
Record, page 46, para. 5 (Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint). 
9
 Record, page 193, para. 6 (Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment); Record, page 16, para. 8 (Complaint); 
Record, page 46, para. 6 (Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint). 
10
 Record, page 193, para. 7 (Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment); see also Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
herein, page 3, para. 5. 
11
 Record, page 193, para. 8 (Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment); Record, pages 48-32 (Answer, Counterclaim 
and Third Party Complaint); see also Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Huish signed the recorded Trust Deed on the Property 
dated July 2, 1986. The Trust Deed clearly, expressly, and 
unambiguously stated it secured a "promissory note of even date 
herewith." Huish also signed the July Note, also dated July 2, 
1986. Since the Trust Deed and the July Note are "of even date," 
by the plain language of the Trust Deed, the Trust Deed secured 
the July Note. 
The July Note provided it was payable in full "upon 
closing of the sale of" the Property. It is undisputed that the 
closing on the sale of the Property from Huish to the Oliversons 
occurred on or before October 29, 1986, and that such sale 
triggered Huish's obligation to pay the July Note in full. That 
sale also, therefore, triggered the running of the statute of 
limitations to foreclose the Trust Deed pursuant to Utah's trust 
deed foreclosure statute, so that Romero had only until October 
29, 1992, at the latest, to foreclose the Trust Deed. 
Romero, however, failed to commence foreclosure of the 
Trust Deed until he filed his Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint on or after January 31, 1995. Since that date is more 
than two (2) years beyond the running of the applicable statute 
of limitations, Romero's attempted foreclosure of the Trust Deed 
was time-barred. As a matter of law, the Trust Deed is no 
herein, page 4, para. 8. 
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longer a valid lien against the Property, and the trial court was 
correct in so holding and in granting summary judgment quieting 
title to the Property in the Oliversons. 
Romero argued to the trial court, and is once again 
here arguing, that there existed disputed questions of material 
fact precluding summary judgment. Specifically, Romero argues 
there were disputes over what note the Trust Deed secured, 
whether the statute of limitations for an action on such note 
(and accordingly to foreclose the Trust Deed) had been tolled, 
and whether such note had been satisfied. 
Romero's arguments, however, are simply an attempt to 
cloud the issues and create the appearance of a factual dispute 
where in fact the issues in this case are clear and simple, and 
the material facts are undisputed. To begin with, Romero claims 
he thought the Trust Deed secured a note dated April 23, 1986 
(the "April Note") , rather than the July Note as clearly stated 
in the Trust Deed. Romero further states that Huish made certain 
payments on the April Note after he sold the Property to the 
Oliversons which tolled the statute of limitations to foreclose 
the Trust Deed. Romero's claim, however, that he thought the 
Trust Deed secured the April Note, is inadmissible parol evidence 
offered in an attempt to alter the clear and unambiguous language 
of the Trust Deed, dated July 2, 1986, that it secured a 
"promissory note of even date herewith," viz. a promissory note 
-9-
dated July 2, 1986. Since the Trust Deed secures the July Notef 
any purported evidence of any post-sale payments on the April 
Note are immaterial to this case and ineffective to preclude 
summary judgment. 
In an apparent attempt to cloud the issue, in his 
brief to this Court, when speaking of the purported post-sale 
payments that Romero claims tolled the statute of limitations, 
Romero claims such payments were made on an "Obligation," which 
term Romero vaguely defined to encompass either the July Note or 
the April Note. It is clear, however, on the face of Romero's 
own affidavit (the only evidence offered in opposition to summary 
judgment), that such purported post-sale payments, if any, were 
only on the April Note. Those alleged payments, therefore, are 
totally irrelevant and immaterial because the Trust Deed by its 
express terms secured the July Note, as the trial court correctly 
held. 
Romero further argues summary judgment was 
inappropriate because he claims there was a dispute over whether 
the vaguely defined "Obligation" had been satisfied. That issue 
is totally irrelevant to this appeal, since the Oliversons' 
Motion was based on the running of the applicable statute of 
limitations, and not upon the obligation secured by the Trust 
Deed having been satisfied. It is the Oliversons1 position that 
the evidence at a trial would have clearly shown that Romero has 
-10-
been paid in full on the July Note (the note actually secured by 
the Trust Deed, and therefore the only note of significance to 
this case).12 It was assumed, however, for the purposes of 
summary judgment only, and specifically to avoid a factual 
dispute, that the July Note had not been satisfied. The trial 
court did not reach the issue of whether the July Note and the 
Trust Deed had been satisfied, nor did it need to. The real 
issue in this appeal, the issue on which summary judgment was 
granted, is the running and expiration of the statute of 
limitations to foreclose the Trust Deed. It is unnecessary and 
completely irrelevant to consider in this appeal whether the July 
Note has been satisfied, and Romero's arguments on that issue are 
totally off-point. 
Romero also argues the statute of limitations to 
foreclose the Trust Deed was tolled by Huish allegedly being 
outside the State of Utah. The only assertion in the Romero 
Affidavit in support of that claim, however, is that Romero was 
told Huish was outside the State of Utah. Since that is clearly 
12
 Only because Romero himself has irrelevantly raised the 
payment issue on this appeal, the Oliversons note that they have 
strong evidence in their possession to show that Romero has been 
paid in full on the July Note, and that he deposited such payment 
in the account of an alias name under which he has actually been 
criminally prosecuted leading to a guilty plea for welfare fraud. 
Again, however, payment simply is not at issue on this appeal 
from a ruling on the applicable statute of limitations, and 
payment therefore raises no factual issues whatsoever in this 
appeal. 
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hearsay, it is inadmissible and does not preclude summary 
judgment.13 
Since the Romero Affidavit does not contain any 
admissible or material evidence, there was no genuine dispute 
over any material fact in this case, and the Oliversons were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the running of 
the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the trial court 
correctly granted summary judgment for the Oliversons, and this 
Court should uphold that decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FOR THE OLIVERSONS SINCE ROMERO FAILED TO PRODUCE 
ANY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE SHOWING A DISPUTE OF 
MATERIAL FACT FOR TRIAL 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Oliversons because there was no 
admissible evidence presented to show the existence of a dispute 
of material fact for trial. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure states that summary judgment "shall be rendered 
forthwith if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
Which in any event is contrary to the admissible affidavit 
of Huish himself stating unequivocally that he was in the State 
of Utah at all relevant times. See Record, pages 343-42 
(Affidavit of Bob Huish). 
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matter of law." The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[a] 
major purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial 
by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder." 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 
(Utah 1984) (affirming summary judgment where opposing affidavit 
was insufficient to create genuine factual issue for trial). The 
only alleged evidence Romero produced in opposition to summary 
judgment was the Romero Affidavit. Since the Romero Affidavit 
consisted entirely of inadmissible and immaterial evidence, it 
was insufficient to raise a genuine issue to present to a fact 
finder, and therefore was insufficient to preclude summary 
judgment. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein." "The mere assertion that an issue 
of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to support 
that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a 
summary judgment motion." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 
(Utah 1983) (upholding summary judgment where opposing affidavit 
was "based on an inadmissible hearsay statement") . Thus, parol 
-13-
evidence, hearsay, and any other statements in an affidavit that 
would not be admissible if testified to at trial, may not 
effectively oppose summary judgment. See id.; Western States 
Thrift & Loan v. Blomquistr 29 Utah 2d 58, 60, 504 P.2d 1019, 
1021 (Utah 1972) (affirming summary judgment where opposing 
affidavit "did not conform to the requirements of Rule 56(e)" 
since it was based on hearsay); Rainford v. Rytingr 22 Utah 2d 
252, 255, 451 P.2d 769, 771 (Utah 1969) (affirming summary 
judgment where opposing affidavits "consisted entirely of 
inadmissible parol evidence") . 
Even if an affidavit opposing summary judgment 
contains evidence that is admissible under Rule 56(e), it is 
ineffective to preclude summary judgment under Rule 56(c) unless 
such evidence shows there is a dispute of material fact. The 
mere existence of disputed issues generally in a case "does not 
preclude the entry of summary judgment if those issues are 
immaterial to resolution of the case." Horgan v. Indus. Design 
Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982) (upholding summary judgment 
dismissing attack on validity of settlement agreement where the 
only disputed facts concerned the underlying dispute rather than 
the settlement agreement); see also Heglar RanchP Inc. v. 
Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) (holding Rule 56(c) 
does not preclude summary judgment "simply whenever some fact 
remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely 
-14-
controverted") . 
As will be shown more fully below, the Romero 
Affidavit, the only purported evidence Romero presented in 
opposition to the Oliversons1 Motion, consisted entirely of 
inadmissible parol evidence and hearsay, and immaterial 
allegations. The Romero Affidavit therefore was wholly 
insufficient to preclude summary judgment, both under Rule 56(c) 
and Rule 56(e). Since there was no admissible evidence disputing 
any material fact, there was nothing to present to a fact finder, 
and a trial was therefore unnecessary. Accordingly, the trial 
court was correct in granting summary judgment for the 
Oliversons, and this Court should affirm that decision. 
A. THE STATEMENT IN THE ROMERO AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING 
ROMERO7S PURPORTED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT NOTE THE 
TRUST DEED SECURED IS INADMISSIBLE PAROL EVIDENCE 
The statement in the Romero Affidavit that "it was and 
is [Romero's] understanding that [the Trust Deed] secures a 
promissory note dated April 23, 1986"14 is inadmissible parol 
evidence in light of the clear and unambiguous language of the 
Trust Deed stating it secured the July Note. In any event, even 
if it were admissible, that statement is not competent to and 
14
 Record, pages 364-63, para. 2 (Defendant's Affidavit in 
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion 
for Summary Judgment) (emphasis added). 
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does not alter the Trust Deed. 
"In the absence of ambiguity, the construction of a 
deed is a question of law" for the court. Terry v. Price Mun. 
Corp., 784 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989) (resolving dispute over 
intent of deed as a question of law by construing the language of 
the deed at issue). When the terms of a deed are "clear and 
unambiguous," it is the court's duty to construe the deed as it 
is written, giving the language its "plain and ordinary meaning 
without resorting to extrinsic evidence." Homer v. Smith, 866 
P.2d 622, 629 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (affirming trial court's 
determination as to the plain language of the deed), cert, denied 
sub nom. Homer v. Sandy Hills, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). 
In this case the Trust Deed clearly and unambiguously 
states it secures "a promissory note of even date herewith." 
Since the Trust Deed is dated July 2, 1986, the clear, plain, and 
ordinary meaning of that language is that the Trust Deed secured 
a promissory note also dated July 2, 1986. The July Note is 
dated July 2, 1986. Given its plain meaning, the Trust Deed 
clearly and unambiguously referred to and was security for the 
July Note, as the trial court correctly held. 
The only evidence Romero offered in opposition to the 
foregoing is the statement in the Romero Affidavit that: 
With respect to the Trust Deed dated July 2, 
1986, (the "Trust Deed") which was recorded against the 
property and which is the subject of this lawsuit, it 
was and is my understanding that it secures a promissoy 
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note dated April 23, 1986, (the "Note") [emphasis 
added] .15 
It is clearly Romero's hope that if he can succeed in 
altering the Trust Deed to secure the April Note, he may be able 
to prove the statute of limitations for him to foreclose the 
Trust Deed was tolled by certain payments Huish purportedly made 
on the April Note after Huish sold the Property to the 
Oliversons. However, not only is the Romero Affidavit completely 
lacking any foundation or explanation whatsoever as to how or why 
Romero purportedly came to such an "understanding," (see e.g. 
Walker v. Rocky Mtn. Rec. Corp.r 29 Utah 2d 274, 279, 508 P.2d 
538, 542 (Utah 1973) (holding affidavit insufficient to preclude 
summary judgment where it merely reflected the affiant's 
"unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions")) , but in the face of 
the clear and unambiguous language of the Trust Deed that it 
secured the July Note, the statement that Romero purportedly 
thought the Trust Deed secured the April Note is inadmissible 
parol evidence, insufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
Parol evidence is not admissible to alter the clear 
and unambiguous terms of a deed. Gillmor v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 
703, 706 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding interpretation of 
unambiguous deed description is question of law, and parol 
15
 Record, pages 364-63, para. 2 (Defendant's Affidavit in 
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion 
for Summary Judgment) (emphasis added). 
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evidence is not admissible). Where a writing "is clear on its 
face, the trial court need not—and in fact should not—consider 
evidence of a contrary meaning." Projects Unlimited v. Cooper 
State Thrift, 798 P.2d 738, 753 (Utah 1990) (affirming summary 
judgment rendered solely on interpretation of terms of recorded 
lien release). The Trust Deed clearly and unambiguously states 
that it secured the July Note. Accordingly, the completely 
unfounded statement in the Romeo Affidavit that Romero understood 
the Trust Deed secured the April Note is groundless inadmissible 
parol evidence, ineffective to preclude summary judgment. 
Rainford v. Rytingr 22 Utah 2d 252, 254, 451 P.2d 769, 
770 (Utah 1969), is particularly instructive to the case at bar. 
Rainford was an action to hold personally liable the guarantors 
on a corporate contract. Summary judgment was granted holding 
the guarantors personally liable. Id. The guarantors appealed, 
arguing they had raised a dispute of fact precluding summary 
judgment by claiming in an affidavit filed on their behalf that 
there was a certain condition to the contract. Id. Noting such 
alleged condition did not appear on the face of the contract, 
however, the Utah Supreme Court concluded the guarantors were 
impermissibly seeking to vary the terms of the contract by parol 
evidence. Thus, explaining Rule 56(e) requires affidavits 
opposing summary judgment to set forth facts that would be 
admissible in evidence, the Court concluded summary judgment 
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against the guarantors "must be sustained, since [their] 
affidavit consisted entirely of inadmissible parol evidence, 
submitted for the purpose of varying and adding to the terms of 
the written agreement of the parties." Rainford, 22 Utah 2d at 
255, 451 P.2d at 771. 
Just as the guarantors in Rainford were attempting to 
alter the terms of the contract by their affidavit, in this case 
Romero is attempting to alter the terms of the Trust Deed by the 
Romero Affidavit. The parol evidence rule, however, prohibits 
Romero from altering the clear and unambiguous terms of the Trust 
Deed that it secured the July Note by stating he subjectively 
thought the Trust Deed secured another note.16 As in Rainford, 
therefore, the Romero Affidavit is ineffective under Rule 56(e) 
to preclude summary judgment since it consists of inadmissible 
parol evidence. 
Additionally, Romero's claimed "understanding" of the 
Trust Deed, even if it were admissible (which it is not), is not 
competent evidence to alter the Trust Deed in any event. 
Romerofs affidavit does not even allege that the Trust Deed in 
fact secured the April Note, nor that either Romero or Huish 
(much less both of them) intended the Trust Deed to secure the 
April Note, nor even that there was any mistake whatsoever in the 
16
 Record, pages 364-63, para. 2 (Defendant's Affidavit in 
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion 
for Summary Judgment). 
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Trust Deed's language that it secured the July Note. Romero's 
affidavit states only, without any supporting or explanatory 
facts of any kind, that Romero himself subjectively understood 
the Trust Deed secured the April Note. Even if that claimed 
understanding were admissible (which it is not), it is not a 
viable legal ground on which to alter the clear, express, and 
unambiguous terms of the Trust Deed that it secured the July 
Note, and is therefore insufficient to preclude summary judgment 
in any event. 
B. THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE ROMERO AFFIDAVIT THAT HUISH 
MADE CERTAIN PAYMENTS ON THE APRIL NOTE ARE 
IMMATERIAL TO THIS CASE BECAUSE THE TRUST DEED 
SECURED THE JULY NOTE 
Romero's claim that the statute of limitations was 
tolled by certain payments Huish allegedly made on the April Note 
(the "Post-Sale Payments") is immaterial to this case, and 
therefore is insufficient to preclude summary judgment, because 
the Trust Deed secured the July Note, not the April Note. Facts 
that are immaterial to the resolution of a case are insufficient 
to preclude the entry of summary judgment. Horgan v. Indus. 
Design Corp.. 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). 
In his brief to this Court, Romero claims Huish made 
certain Post-Sale Payments on "the Obligation secured by the 
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Trust Deed."17 By vaguely defining the term "Obligation" to 
encompass "either the April 23, 1986 note or the July 2, 1986 
note,"18 Romero has attempted in this appeal to create the 
appearance of a factual dispute over whether such alleged Post-
Sale Payments could have applied to the July Note and therefore 
could have tolled the statute of limitations to foreclose the 
Trust Deed that secured the July Note. A review of the Romero 
Affidavit, however, clearly reveals that the only evidence Romero 
offered regarding any Post-Sale Payments refers expressly and 
exclusively to payments on the April Note. Romero claims in his 
affidavit that he received certain Post-Sale Payments "as partial 
satisfaction of the amount owing under the Note."19 "Note" is a 
specifically-defined term in the Romero Affidavit, defined by 
Romero to refer to "a promissory note dated April 23
 P 1986"20 
(i.e., the April Note). By using the term "Obligation" in his 
brief to this Court when referring to the alleged Post-Sale 
Payments, Romero is attempting to distance himself from his own 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, page 13. 
18
 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, page 10. 
19
 Record, page 363, para. 5 (Defendants Affidavit in 
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion 
for Summary Judgment). 
20
 Record, pages 364-63, para. 2 (Defendant's Affidavit in 
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion 
for Summary Judgment) (emphasis added). 
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affidavit and disguise the fact that his only purported evidence 
of any claimed Post-Sale Payments relates only to the April Note, 
which as a matter of law is not secured by the Trust Deed and 
therefore is immaterial and ineffective to preclude summary 
judgment. At no time, including in his brief to this Court and 
his own affidavit, has Romero ever alleged or even argued, that 
Huish ever made any Post-Sale Payments whatsoever on the July 
Note which the Trust Deed secured. 
Romero also improperly argues there is a dispute as to 
whether the "Obligation" secured by the Trust Deed has been 
satisfied. For purposes of this appeal there is no such dispute 
because for purposes of the Oliversons' Motion only it was 
assumed, arguendo, and specifically for the purpose of avoiding a 
factual dispute on the issue, that the July Note (which, again, 
is the note the Trust Deed secured) had not been satisfied.21 In 
any event, however, the satisfaction of the July Note is 
completely irrelevant and immaterial to the issue on which 
summary judgment was granted, and therefore to the issue now 
before this Court, viz., the running and expiration of the 
applicable statute of limitations for Romero to foreclose on the 
aged Trust Deed. Even if it were disputed, which it was not for 
21
 Record, page 168 (Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment); Record, page 196 (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment). 
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the purposes of summary judgment, the issue of the satisfaction 
of the July Note could not preclude summary judgment. The 
applicable statute of limitations has still run even if the July 
Note was not paid. See Horganf 657 P.2d at 752 (holding dispute 
over issues that are "immaterial to resolution of the case" is 
insufficient to preclude summary judgment). 
C. THE STATEMENT IN THE ROMERO AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING 
HUISH'S PURPORTED ABSENCE FROM THE STATE IS 
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY 
The statement in the Romero Affidavit that "[i]n 1992 
and 1993 [Romero] was informed" that Huish was outside the State 
of Utah22 is pure hearsay which fails the standard for 
admissibility under Rule 56(e) and is therefore insufficient to 
preclude summary judgment. "Hearsay and opinion testimony that 
would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not 
properly be set forth in an affidavit" opposing summary judgment. 
Walker v. Rocky Mtn. Rec. Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 279, 508 P.2d 
538, 542 (Utah 1973) (holding affidavit insufficient to preclude 
summary judgment). 
Since the Romero Affidavit does not purport to state 
any personal knowledge or evidentiary facts on the issue, but 
Record, page 363, para. 7 (Defendant's Affidavit in 
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion 
for Summary Judgment) (emphasis added). 
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states only that Romero "was informed" that Huish had left the 
state,23 that statement is inadmissible hearsay. See Utah R. 
Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as any "statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted).24 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held statements 
similar to those in the Romero Affidavit inadmissible to oppose 
summary judgment under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In Western States Thrift & Loan v. BlomquistP 504 
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972), for example, the defendant filed an 
affidavit opposing summary judgment in which the defendant stated 
he had been "informed" of certain facts that the defendant 
contended created a dispute precluding summary judgment. The 
Blomquist Court noted that "an affidavit opposing a motion for 
summary judgment is an evidentiary affidavit, whose form and 
content is governed by 56(e)." Id. at 1020-21. The Court then 
upheld summary judgment, explaining "[t]he assertions in 
defendant's affidavit, which were essential to create a genuine 
issue as to a material fact, were based on information and belief 
23
 Record, page 363, para. 7 (Defendant's Affidavit in 
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion 
for Summary Judgment) (emphasis added). 
24
 In any event, that statement is legally insufficient to 
counter the admissible affidavit of Huish himself which clearly 
and unequivocally states that at all relevant times Huish resided 
in the State of Utah and was in fact within the State of Utah. 
Record,-pages 343-42, paras. 2 and 4 (Affidavit of Bob Huish). 
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and hearsay, and did not conform to the requirements of Rule 
56(e)." Id^ at 1021; see also Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 
1172-73 (Utah 1983) (upholding summary judgment where opposing 
affidavit stated merely that affiant had been "told" certain 
facts, since such statement was inadmissible hearsay). 
Romero's mere assertion that he was told or informed 
that Huish was out of state is hearsay that would be inadmissible 
if testified to at the trial of this case.25 Therefore, Romero's 
assertion is not admissible to oppose summary judgment. 
II. NONE OP THE LAW CITED BY ROMERO SUPPORTS 
REVERSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Romero has not cited any law that would support this 
Court's reversal of the summary judgment granted by the trial 
court. The only law Romero has cited is off-point and 
insufficient to warrant this Court's reversal of summary 
judgment. For example, Romero cited Projects Unlimited,. Inc. v. 
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.r 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990), Bill 
Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977), ProMark 
Group, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,860 P.2d 964 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), 
and Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah 
Such hearsay is, in any event, legally insufficient to 
contradict the express statement of Huish himself in his own 
affidavit that he was at all relevant times within the State of 
Utah. See Record, pages 343-42, paras. 2 and 4 (Affidavit of Bob 
Huish). 
-25-
Ct. App. 1989) for the propositions that the facts and inferences 
should be construed in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment, and that all doubts should be resolved 
in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Brown Realty 
and Beehive are both distinguishable from the case at bar, 
however, because they involved unclear and ambiguous documents 
that left factual questions. Projects and ProMark, on the other 
hand, actually support the trial court's decision in this case 
because they upheld summary judgment based on the interpretation 
of clear and unambiguous terms in the governing documents. 
Since the applicable statute of limitations has 
expired as a matter of law, Romero's attempted foreclosure of the 
Trust Deed is time-barred, precluding any possible relief to 
Romero in this case. Accordingly, Romero's citations to Frisbee 
v. K&K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 327 (Utah 1984) and Tanner v. Utah 
Poultry & Farmers Coop.P 359 P.2d 18 (Utah 1961) for the 
proposition that summary judgment should be granted only when the 
moving party shows, as a matter of law, that no relief is 
possible, are completely inapposite to this case. 
The cases Romero cited for the propositions that a 
single sworn statement can raise a factual dispute precluding 
summary judgment are also inapplicable to this case because that 
rule assumes the sworn statements contain admissible evidence, 
which Romero has not produced in this case. The only statement 
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Romero produced in this case was his own affidavit, and such 
affidavit did not contain any evidence admissible under the 
standards of Rule 56(e) to oppose summary judgment, as shown 
above. 
Likewise, Romero's citations for the proposition that 
courts should be cautious in granting summary judgment and thus 
depriving litigants of the opportunity to present their case at 
trial do not apply because Romero has not produced any admissible 
evidence for trial. See Reagan Outdoor Advertisingf Inc. v. 
Lundgren. 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984) ("A major purpose of 
summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the 
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is a 
genuine issue to present to the fact finder") . 
Moreover, the cases cited by Romero regarding the 
general rule which allows a tolling of the statute of limitations 
by virtue of payments on the underlying note are also 
inapplicable to this case because, as shown above, there were no 
payments on the July Note which the Trust Deed secured. 
Finally, the cases cited by Romero regarding tolling 
of the statute of limitations by a defendant's absence from the 
state also do not apply because Romero has not produced any 
admissible evidence to show Huish was outside the State of Utah 
at any relevant time. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment for 
the Oliversons based upon the running of the statute of 
limitations because there were no admissible or material disputed 
facts for trial on that issue. Since the Trust Deed clearly and 
unambiguously states it secured the July Note, Romero's assertion 
that he thought the Trust Deed secured the April Note is 
inadmissible parol evidence lacking any foundation whatsoever, 
and in any event is legally insufficient to alter the Trust Deed; 
Romero's claim that Huish made certain Post-Sale Payments on the 
April Note therefore is immaterial to this case. Romero's claim 
that the July Note has not been satisfied is likewise immaterial 
to this case, since the statute of limitations has run to enforce 
such debt anyway, and in any event such claim does not raise a 
dispute of fact since it was assumed for purposes of the 
Oliversons' Motion only that the July Note had not been paid, as 
Romero claims. Romero's assertion that he was told that Huish 
was outside the State of Utah is inadmissible hearsay that is 
also without foundation and legally insufficient to contradict 
Huish's affidavit that he was at all relevant times within the 
State of Utah. 
Since, as a matter of law, the applicable statute of 
limitations for Romero to foreclose the Trust Deed has expired, 
the trial court correctly rendered summary judgment for the 
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Oliversons. This Court should uphold that ruling. 
Respectfully submitted this of February, 1998, 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE 
& PARKINSON, P.C. 
By:. M&A dc-Robert JiL Dale 
Bradley L. Tilt 
Attorneys for Appellee 
-29-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES were hand-delivered 
this iji^~day of February, 1998, to each of the following: 
James R. Wilson 
APPEL & WARLAUMONT, L.C. 
9 Exchange Place 
1100 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kirk G. Gibbs 
Kipp and Christian, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and were mailed via first class mail, postage fully prepaid 
thereon, to each of the following: 
Gordon Duval 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
J. Scott Lundberg 
P.O. Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290 
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James R. Wilson, 6455 
Jody L. Howe, 4743 
HOWE & TANNER 
Broadway Centre, Suite 340 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)575-7100 
Facsimile: (801) 575-7150 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN D. OLIVERSON and RUTH H. 
OLIVERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LESTER ROMERO and J. SCOTT 
LUNDBERG, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Civil No. 940400709 
Judge: Anthony W. Schofield 
AFFIANT BEING FIRST DULY SWORN DEPOSES AND STATES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled proceeding, and submit this affidavit in 
support of my memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 
2. With respect to the Trust Deed dated July 2, 1986, (the "Trust Deed") which was 
recorded against the property and which is the subject of this lawsuit, it was, and is my 
understanding that it secures a promissory note dated April 23, 1986, (the "Note"). (See Note 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 
3. I have not received full payment or satisfaction of the obligation due under The Note. 
4. Both prior to, and subsequent to the "closing" referred to by plaintiff in their motion 
for summary judgment, Mr. Huish ("Huish") and I reached agreements (the "Agreements") to extend 
the amount of time in which Huish would satisfy the obligation owing under The Note. Pursuant 
to the Agreements, Huish promised to make the monthly interest payments until he was able to 
satisfy the entire balance due. 
5. I received the following payments from Huish as partial satisfaction of the amount 
owing under the Note: $100.00, August 7, 1986; $100.00, November 15, 1987; $50.00, May 27, 
1989; and $100.00, December 7, 1992. I am currently unable to locate copies of the canceled 
checks evidencing the above-mentioned payments and believe them to be with my previous attorney. 
6. Because of the difficulty of getting Huish to satisfy the obligation owing under the 
Note, I retained the services of Mr. Ben Browning, an attorney and G.L. Hackett & Company, a 
collection agency. Mr. Browning received at least one payment from Huish, after which he sent me 
a letter as well as a check for $50.00. (See letter attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). In addition, G.L. 
Hackett & Company received at least one payment from Huish. (See receipt attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C"). 
7. I have spent considerable time and effort in attempting to locate Huish in order to 
arrange further payments of the Note. In 1992 and 1993, I was informed by Huish's landlords, as 
well as by the plaintiffs, that Huish had left the State of Utah. 
2 
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DATED this ) I day of October, 1996. 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRffiED TO AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public, by Lester 
Romero, this / / day of C(+ilJl I . 1996. 
r*& 
^ G A U J A K £ U £ F • 
u7&uj^Ma»Stre«i.M0D .» 
^dituxeatv, Utah 84111 « 
^Comn*M«ne*DtrB3S/flK* | 
STATE OF UTAH 
'^l\W/U(^(lCl 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
PROMISSORY NOTE (Interest) 
f^ 
19 
The undersigned, jointly and severally, premise to pay to the order of.. 
Utah, or at such other place as the holder hereof may designate 
in writino s * j £ i X J f i ^ ^ poyob.e o. ,o.,ows, 
T-^T Sx "THjt/h\^i A^O co/io(j Ooawi VLU^ £}!/-> y&irj7€Cc<,i /cwfttufioi* /WCflninci 
together both before and after judgment, with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from date until paid at the rate of .5?. . / . .Z^fmt cent [..J. % ) 
per annum, interest payable as followst 
Prepayment of this note with interest to date of payment may be made at any time without penalty. 
If the holder deems itself insecure or if default be made in payment of the whole or any part of any installment at the time when or the place 
where the same becomes due and payable as aforesaid, then the entire unpaid balance, with interest as aforesaid, shall, at the election of the holder 
hereof and without notice of said election at once become due and payable. In event of any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly and 
severally, agree to pay to the holder hereof reasonable attorney's fees, legal expenses and lawful collection costs in addition to all other sums due 
hereunder. 
Presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of time without notice are hereby waived and the undersigned consent to the 
release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
:: (^ r/V! Q o 
Address 
FORM etS - INTEREST NOTE - GEM PRINTING CO - SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 
Exhibit A 0381 
bEN BROWNING 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
1020 KEARNS BLD. 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
May 27, 1989 
Dear Les, 
Enclosed 500.00 collected on Ray Hall. 
Received 50.00 from Bob K Huish. 
I will keep working on your other accounts, 
Sincerly, 
Exhibit B 
TELEPHONE (801) 364-1100 
0380 
(ok 
4^M 
G. L. HACKETT & COMPANY 
901-02 C O N T I N E N T A L B A N K B U I L D I N G P H O N E : 359-2833 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H 84101 
NO. 
RECEIVED Y [ o T ? ^ 
DATE 
^ 
- 1 9 & 
. THANK YOU. 
(£<S& 
T DOLLARS 
AMOUNT or ACCOUNT £ 
AMOUNT PAID S . 
BALANCE DUE . . . . . . S _ _ 
CASH D CHECK D M. O. Q 
F O R M N O . 1703 
G . L . H A C K E T T & C O M P A N Y 
Br\/»^ZX^. 
Exhibit C 
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